

## The Dark Side of the World at War

An all day event on the making of the 1971 Thames Television series 'The World at War' featured presentations by the executive producer Jeremy Isaacs the associate producer Jerry Kuehl, researcher Sue McConachy, Michael Darlow, producer of 'Genocide', and Richard Overy, the historian from Kings College London. The conference, held on June 28 at Queen Mary College, University of London, was organised by John Ramsden. He hopes to make recordings of the sessions available to all those interested in how this series was made.

This document is Jerry Kuehl's presentation of 'The Dark Side of the World at War'.

This title is something of a misnomer. If you're expecting me to reveal how I managed to claim expenses for lunches about possible sales of the series to Scandinavia with 'Bent Axelrod', or about the use of animals in wartime with 'R.T. Tin', you will be disappointed. Nor will I talk about the habit of the cutting room team working on the Holocaust programme to answer their telephone with a cheery 'Death Camps'. And I won't even raise the issue of why we in our over crowded bunker at Teddington Lock, which, like most bunkers leaked when it rained, were never prosecuted by the authorities for violations of health and safety regulations.

The dark side of the World at War I want to talk about is something it shares with all other visual histories. I have to apologise for the quality of the print you'll see: It's an informal recording of a lecture I gave a few years ago which included *Today's History* a show intended for Channel 4. Not only is the picture and sound quality appalling, but the audience reacts a bit too. Even so I think that you'll be able to get the drift of the conversation

### **Clip: Sherwood Foresters**

*Oh yes we got pulled out the, we were out the line at the time. Of course this I believe what officer it was detailed so many of us to go to certain places and when we got there they gave us, right, said put these on, German green uniforms, you know jerry helmets. I said what the hell, what are they going to do, drop us into German lines or something you know. Anyway he said no, you're all right, here you are, take these. gave us a box of fireworks, crackers, fire crackers we used to call them. Go in that wood, he said, and act as Germans. He says and third platoon will come and capture you he said. When you see them coming, keep throwing these crackers so of course I just kept, see them coming, throwing these*

*crackers and firing blanks of course. The platoon the English platoon come and captured us and we had to go out in this wood looking frightened to death, you know with hands up and this fellow was up on top of this truck with a camera. Pathé Gazette, that was British news that was being on the cinema that was at home.*

Those were Sherwood Foresters brought together by Ben Shephard, one of our producers, to talk about their experiences in the western desert and at the Anzio beachhead. The story was never used in the series. As you can see it's a curious document, for two reasons. The first is because the story, if true, shows how cavalier newsreels could be in the pursuit of material. This was common practice. British Pathé's own cameraman Terry Ashford was notorious for his set-ups shot far behind the lines in the western desert, and Ronnie Noble, a courageous British Gaumont camera operator ruefully pointed out just why combat filming was so difficult. His complaint is worth recording in full:

**Quote: Ronnie Noble**

*Cameraman: R Noble*

*Date: 6.6.42*

*Story: Activity at the Front in the Western Desert*

*Length 600 feet.*

*Note. These shots are disjointed and have no immediate connection with each other. I find that when in the very front line it is impossible to build up or follow through a complete story, the situation is far too fluid and when under constant shell fire and continual bombing it is impossible to ask units to stunt shots to build up a story, the only way to do this is to stay in the back areas, and then none of the action shots are genuine...*

That's not the only reason why the clip is curious. Another is that the incident does not seem to have taken place in the form described by these soldiers reminiscing some 30 years after the event. It cannot have taken place in the desert 'after Alemain' because the desert is treeless. Nor did any Pathe camera trucks tag along with the British 8<sup>th</sup> army, though Paul Wyand did take a British Movietone vehicle with sound recording apparatus to Italy in 1943. However there is no record of any Pathe story—issued or unused, or dope sheet relating to the incident in however a sanitised form, by either Terry Ashford or anyone else. There is no record of it in the records of the Army Film and Photo Unit either.

The tale, though vividly remembered, told in good faith, and corroborated by the very people who took part in it seems to have no basis in fact. It could be an ill-remembered event which took place during the Forester's time at Anzio. It could even be a collective false memory, spawned by many nights in that well stocked pub But it could also be an episode which took place not in the desert or at Anzio, but during training in Britain in 1941.

Mark Davis from the Pathe library has unearthed an entry from the British Pathe database, which reads

*Army training exercise with British troops taking the part of the Germans. The story could pass for an actual attack as actions and uniforms do not look fake. ...*

*The officer fires his pistol to signal to his men. They charge towards the pillbox with bayonets fixed. Various shots of British soldiers taking the pillbox. The German soldiers come out with their arms up, looking very cowardly and frightened.*

*Note: British soldiers are playing part of Germans.*

Whatever the Forester's story is it does not seem to be a veridical account of an episode which took place during the 8<sup>th</sup> army's campaign, either in the Libyan desert nor at the Anzio beachhead.

Here is another clip, from episode six of the series, *America Enters the War*, produced by Peter Batty.

### **Clip: USS Robin Moore 33"**

*June the 11 1941, an American freighter, the Robin Moore was sunk by a U-boat. Roosevelt used this as a pretext for occupying Iceland, and relieving the British garrisons there. September the 4<sup>th</sup>, the U.S. destroyer Greer was attacked near Iceland . Roosevelt now told his navy to shoot on sight.*

You may well wonder what courageous German cameraman filmed these underwater scenes of torpedoes launched from U-boats in the frigid waters of the north Atlantic, and then surfaced just in time to see the crew members of the stricken *Greer* abandoning ship. The answer, of course, is that no one filmed the attack on the *Robin Moor* or the *Greer*. This film is no more a veridical account of these episodes than is the Sherwood Forester's account of their encounter with the Pathe cameraman.

There, in a nutshell, is the real ‘Dark Side of the World at War’: Neither the stories told by the participants, nor the film which illustrates them, are wholly reliable. What makes the story darker still, is that there is no point in the series in which the self-authenticating veracity of the participants is openly challenged, and only one point where any doubt is cast on the aptness of the images which the spectator sees. Here it is. It’s from *Stalingrad*, produced by Hugh Raggett.

### **Clip: Stalingrad**

*The Russian plans were ambitious. Their two pincers would cut through the Rumanians and link at Kalatch. That would trap the German sixth army. They could then reduce the Stalingrad pocket and strike Southeast towards Rostov. That would trap all the Germans in the Caucasus. Just four days after the Russian offensive began , the two armies did link up. It all happened so quickly there was no time to film it. So it was re-enacted for the cameras.*

I wrote that script, and being able to say *There was no time to film it so it was re-enacted for the cameras* gave me enormous satisfaction. It was obvious from the foot prints in the snow and the position of the camera midway between the two armies that the scene was a reconstruction. I ought to have probed a bit further. If the Red Army had gone to the trouble of re-enacting the link up between the Don and the Stalingrad fronts, what other battles might they have re-fought?

It took a while for me to realise what must have happened: The collapse of the German armies was so swift and comprehensive that the Russians were unable to lay railway track rapidly to ship their reinforcements east to pursue the enemy. This left many troops hanging about in Stalingrad waiting for transport to the front. These troops were used not only to film the ‘linkup’ but to ‘fight’ many if not all of the snow covered battle scenes in the city itself.

Visual history can be like that: Dodgy stories illustrated by even dodgier film. There were incidentally no interviews in Stalingrad so all the dodginess is concentrated in my commentary. I’m not sure whether that makes it better or worse.

Let me show a sequence from *Wolf Pack*, the story of the battle for the north Atlantic. It was produced by Ted Childs.

### **Clip: Wolf Pack 1'49'**

*But the time was coming when courage was no longer enough. Radio had remained essential to wolf pack operations. But new allied direction finding equipment could pick up German signals and plot where they came from. With short-wave radar escort could now locate U-boats on the surface. Often sighting the U-boat before her crew could see them, the low silhouette was no longer such an advantage. ASDIC equipment too was improving. Escort ships could track a submerged U-boat as she twisted and turned at low underwater speed. There were new weapons like the hedgehog for the kill. The Germans did not realise the extent of British and American technical advances nor did they match them.*

Oh Dear. We know now that the battle of the north Atlantic was won not primarily by a struggle which pitted long range aircraft and surface ships equipped with ASDIC, radar, and depth charges against tenacious German submariners, but by the landlubbers at Bletchley Park, where the British learned how to decipher the German naval code. The first full length account of this astonishing revelation were not published by F. W. Winterbotham until 1974, and the last of our programmes was completed in 1972. If we had the films to make over again, redoing *Wolf Pack* would be top of the list, although many other shows, like those dealing with the allied defeat at Crete would also be affected.

In that battle, the allied commander, Sir Bernard Freyberg was ordered, verbally, by his commander, Sir Archibald Wavell not to use information which might have allowed him to successfully defend the island, because using it could have betrayed its source as a British intercept of *Enigma* a code which the Germans wrongly thought to be unbreakable.

This I should say was standard practice with *Ultra*, the British name for such high level intercepts: For them to be used as a basis for action, knowledge acquired from them had to be corroborated by a plausible, independent source. Churchill himself said that it was better to lose a battle than to lose this source. Here is what Sir John Colville, Churchill's private secretary, said in programme 4 *Alone*, produced by David Elstein.

### **Clip: Sir John Colville**

*He thought it important that Crete should be held at all costs. If we lost Crete we lost our base in the eastern Mediterranean. Our naval base and our air base. And he kept on telegraphing to Wavell saying surely you can spare just a dozen tanks for the defence of Maleme airfield which was*

*the chief airfield in Crete against German paratroops. And Wavell replied that he had no tanks, that they were all having their tracks mended or having their engines greased or something in the Delta and that he couldn't spare even a dozen. Well, Crete was lost, it was a great disaster, upset everybody in the House of Commons, upset the country. It was a low point for us in the war, in the spring of 1941.*

In the transcript which follows, Colville immediately says:

*And shortly after this disaster Colonel Laycock who was subsequently Chief of Combined Operations but at this time was a comparatively unknown officer, but was a friend of certain of Churchill's social acquaintances, was brought to Chequers for luncheon. And as he'd been in Crete Churchill listened with great interest to what he had to say. And there came the moment when Laycock said 'I really believe that Crete could have been saved. If we only could have kept the airfield, if we'd just had a dozen tanks, I'm sure we could have held the airfield from the Germans.' And Churchill's eyes opened wide and I felt as if could hear a nail being hammered into Wavell's reputation and coffin.*

I do not know, incidentally, how many of the senior military commanders, or highly placed civilians, we interviewed were privy to the *Ultra* intercepts. Sir John Colville certainly was, General Sir Brian Urquhart and Lord Mountbatten must have been. This posed a dilemma for them since they had to frame their answers to our questions in a form which would be both plausible and convincing as a account of events, not betray their insider's knowledge, yet not make them look like horses asses when the truth about what really went on at Bletchley Park became known.

In other words, some of our interviewees were economical with the truth. Sir John Colville certainly was. Though hardly surprising, this practice does make life hard for historians. But then, the job of those who protected the secrets of Bletchley was not to make life easy for historians, it was to win the war.

Being economical with the truth, and remembering things that never happened are two conspicuous examples of the dangers of constructing visual history on such fragile building blocks. Another is to simply say things that aren't true. Here's a relatively trivial example from episode 4, *France Falls*, produced by Peter Batty.

### Clip: Gordon Waterfield 22”

*The great idea on the Germans’ part was speed and they sent ahead of the army policemen with truncheons and white gloves who went on motor And em the whole—they all had their Michelin guide for France, they knew exactly where the roads were.*

The idea of the *Panzer* armies sweeping through France clutching their secret weapons, white gloves and the Michelin Guide, is pretty ingenious. But it doesn’t seem to have triggered a revolution in the academic study of the German campaign in France in 1940. That might be because the claim was made neither by a French officer, nor a *Wehrmacht* veteran, but was simply speculation based on hear-say by a Reuters correspondent.

There is an epistemological problem with every one of these interviews: how seriously *can* we, *should* we *dare* we, take their descriptions of personalities and events. One person who did not speak from personal experience was Stephen Ambrose, who was—quite deliberately—incorporated into the penultimate programme to offer a historian’s perspective on the closing stages of the war and its immediate aftermath. In other cases, with one exception, participants were expected to speak of events which they personally experienced, or make judgements about persons known to them personally.

The one exception was McGeorge Bundy, who was allowed to quote what Henry Stimson, the American Secretary of War told President Harry S. Truman about the atomic bomb. Inevitably, this kind of oral history, where participants do not say what happened to themselves, but only to retail second hand accounts of other persons’ conversation or even diary entries, becomes more frequent as witnesses die. Since one of the main reasons for doing oral history is to be able to take in the body language and voice inflexions of subjects as they tell what happened to them, there is something a bit odd, if not totally pointless, about such a history which only retails what other people have written.

Although McGeorge Bundy is a pretty cold fish, I could be persuaded to take an interest in him if he related what either Henry Stimson or President Truman told him. But he is so far detached from the events of which he speaks that using him was not, in my view, a sensible use of valuable film stock. Here is McGeorge Bundy, interviewed for programme 23, *The Bomb*, produced by David Elstein.

### **Clip: McGeorge Bundy**

*When he was sworn in two week earlier, Truman said he would continue Roosevelt's policies. But his sudden harshness with Molotov now worried the secretary of war, Henry Stimson. The day after he confrontation, Stimson told Truman about something he though could transform America's dealings with the Soviet Union.*

*On April 24 Stimson wrote to Truman "I think it is very important that I should have a talk with you as soon as possible on a highly secret matter. I mentioned it to you shortly after you took office but have not urged it since on account of the pressure you've been under. It however has such a bearing on our present foreign relations and has such an important effect upon all my thinking in this field that I think you ought to know about it without much further delay" The next day April 25 Stimson explained to Truman that his view of foreign policy, Stimson's, was dominated by the imminent prospect of atomic power and the terms which might be got from Russia in exchange for sharing atomic secrets.*

I hope the excitement of that digression wasn't too exhausting.

Some of the testimonies we recorded were relatively brief—a single 10 minute reel was we thought, adequate. Others, like those of Rudolph Verba, an Auschwitz survivor, ran for several hours. It's worth reminding ourselves that all these interviews were shot on film, not video tape. Film was expensive, and tape is cheap. That meant we felt we could not afford to be leisurely, and haste is of course often the enemy of reflection. This is bad oral history practice, but we thought of ourselves as film makers, not oral historians. (Don't forget the first issue of the Oral History Society journal only appeared in 1971, when we were well into production).

Interviewees must have often wished we would slow down, and allow them to speak without being hurried along to the next question. But often the hurry was not on the interviewees part. Sometimes the production team itself was responsible for being economical with the truth. Here is part of an interview with Emmi Bonhöffer, for Programme 1, *A New Germany*, produced by Hugh Raggett.

### **Clip: Emmi Bonhöffer**

*When the synagogues were burning, everyone knew what was going on. I remember that my brother in law, the husband of my sister Leni, Huber.*

*when he went in the morning after the day of the Kristallnacht, Reichskristallnacht or how you say it, he went by train to his office downtown and between the stations of Savignyplatz and the zoological gardens there is the Jewish synagogue, and he saw that it was burning, yah, and he murmured Kulturschande that is insult for cultured shame for our culture. Well, right away a gentleman in front of him turned his revier, showed his Parteiabzeichen his party badge and took out his papers and he was a man of the Gestapo and he had to show his papers to give his address and was ordered to come to the party office next morning at nine o'clock.*

What happened to the brother in law? The viewer of the series never knew, but Emmi went on to explain in a longer programme *Hitler's Germany*, made by Raye Farr.

### **Clip: Emmi Bonhöffer**

*And when my brother in law came home in the evening he told my sister what had happened and she said couldn't you keep your mouth, what will happen now, they will take you in a concentration camp and we'll be rid of you. All of us were very excited and next morning he had to go to the party and he was investigated about what he had—er talk himself out of it , yah. And the result was that his punishment was that he had to arrange and to distribute the ration cards for the area each beginning of each month for years until the end of the war. That was in '38 yah so each end of the month the family had to arrange the cards for heavy working people, for men, for women, for children, for little children, and all these special cards and so they had to arrange at home and then he had to go and he had to go alone to do it, he was not permitted to have the help of his children, he had to do it alone and for years an they observed him and he couldn't risk to arrange any help for him. That was the way how they broke the back of the people with these things. This is typical.*

Why was this left out of *The New Germany*? Because it's two minutes and thirty three seconds long. Raye's programme had three hours to tell the story of the Third Reich from the inside, while Jeremy's programme had 52 minutes 45 seconds to tell the story of Europe from 1933 to 1939. Something had to go.

There is, finally, a kind of oral testimony which is unreliable as a source of veridical claims about the past because those who offer it, don't misremember, don't forget, don't embellish their stories, aren't economical with the truth. They just lie. In other words, they say of that

which is the case that it is not the case , or of that which is not the case that it is the case. Here is Major Otto Remer, speaking at the very end of Raye Farr's production, of *Hitler's Germany* and lying. He first says, in a part of the interview which was not used in the film:

*I have to be frank and tell you that we have hardly noticed anything of these concentration camps during the Third Reich. I have once heard mentioned the figure of 35,000 prisoners in camps before the war. This corresponds to a normal number of prisoners elsewhere. The only difference was that the ones in concentration camps were to be re-educated through decent work. Everyone who was willing to work was able to get out of these camps without being harmed in any way.*

What was used in the film was this.

### **Clip: Otto Remer**

*In any case we never planned to murder the Jews. This happened as a consequence of the war reaching its peak. It cannot be justified and has made us unfortunately many enemies after the war, and led to the fact that nobody today even thinks about the good that Adolf Hitler did for Germany and Europe.*

Just to remind you: The first *Einsatzgruppen* began their lethal work during the Polish campaign of 1939, long before the war 'reached its peak'

Now these seem to be pretty unreliable foundations on which to build any kind of veridical history

So far as our used of film is concerned, let me remind you that there is no such thing as generic film. Every foot of film was shot by a particular camera at a particular time and in a particular place. Note that I don't say was shot by *someone* at a particular time and in a particular place. Cameras can be programmed to film automatically Of course generic commentary is perfectly possible—without it it would be impossible to make historical (or probably any other kind) of films. It's obvious that oral histories present horrendous difficulties when any attempt is made to match specific utterances to specific images. 31”

Problems do not normally arise when an interviewee makes generalised remarks, or assesses character or describes routine or commonplace events: Not even the most fastidious historian need object to showing

contextually appropriate film as Werner Pusch (whom we saw in *A New Germany*) describes a Hitler speech of the 1930s even though Pusch himself was not present. *Contextually appropriatley* means a 1930's Hitler speech: not one from the mid-forties or late twenties.

The serious problems come when interviewees relate personal anecdotes which either were not, or could not have been, filmed by anyone. An example is the encounter between Emmi Bonhöffer's brother in law and the *Gestapo*. There are two ways to deal with this issue. The first, which we by and large resisted, would be to drop in a couple of feet of 'generic' film, i.e. a German crowd scene from the late 1930s and pretend, if challenged by a nit picking historians that one of its members had a party badge concealed behind his lapel. The second is of course, to resist the temptation to use film at all. Emmi Bonhöffer's English is imperfect, but that hardly matters.

Navigating between the particularity of the anecdotal account and the precision of the recorded image is a challenge at the best of times, and I'm not sure we always succeeded: Here is a clip from *Genocide*, produced by Michael Darlow. The speaker is Schmeul Gogol. One problem to bear in mind is that though we have a better filmed record of Hitler's war of extermination against Europe's Jews than we ever believed possible, the record is very incomplete, and will always remain so.

### **Clip: Schmeul Gogol**

*We ran out of food in the house, and my mother, may her soul rest in peace, asked me to get up at night and go down to the bakery and stand there the whole night in order to get a loaf of bread the next day so there would be something to eat when I arrived there were already masses and masses of people standing in line.*

*Among us there were little children, non Jews, poles running around. They dragged that same Pole over and pointed at each and every person: 'That's a Jew' 'That's a Jew',--'Das Jude'. 'Das Jude', 'Das Jude' so that these people would be taken out of line and not get any bread....*

*My turn came. I turned around and saw that the boy was a friend with whom I played. I said to him in Polish 'What are you doing?' His answer was 'I 'm not your friend. You are a Jew. I don't know you'*

The decision about how and indeed whether to illustrate Schmucl Gogol's his story could not have been easy. The scene clearly does not describe the anecdote told by Gogol. But a case can be made for using these images, and it goes like this: These are indisputably scenes of Poland, and probably of the Lodz ghetto in 1940, They show the degradation to which the population including Jews was subject. Though not a literal representation of the event described in the anecdote, the scenes show more strikingly than words the overweening behaviour of the Nazi occupiers and their acolytes towards the conquered Poles.

In a programme which, don't forget was probably the first attempt to come to terms with the Shoa on television, the imprecision was less important than graphically representing the reality of the German occupation. This argument 1) accepts that the images do not literally illustrate the anecdote 2) suggests this is an acceptable price to pay for the visual impact other elements included in the scene may have on viewers. Notice this is different from claiming that the misrepresentation is acceptable because it serves a higher purpose, i.e. an imaginative understanding of the Shoa.

How far have we come? Considerably beyond dodgy stories illustrated by dodgy film, I hope. The building blocks from which the oral history elements of the *World at War* were constructed were indeed fragile, but they were not systematically unreliable as accounts of the remembered behaviour of individuals.

Even in *Wolf Pack* the remembered experience of the merchant seamen and the crews of the escort vessels would probably not have been much different even if they'd known that Bletchly Park was on their side. Few people lied, which is not the same as saying their point of view was not hopelessly partisan. Many were economical with the truth but this wasn't always their fault, while the stories told, and the judgements made about persons and events amply justified the decision to build *The World at War* on the basis of lived experience as told by participants.

Credit where credit is due: The BBC's *Great War*, and Michael Darlow's productions of *Cities at War* for Granada, and Granada's *All Our Yesterdays* pioneered this kind of use of oral history.

So far as the film which accompanied these stories was concerned, we tried to steer a course between the *Scylla* of the *Robin Moore* and the *Charybdis* of Schmucl Gogol. In other words we tried to eschew unacknowledged fictions, and we tried (I have to say with less success) to

respect the injunction that if we showed film purporting to illustrate a particular event or anecdote, it was that episode and not another which we showed. At least we never used the *Gestapo* agent with a party badge hidden behind his lapel.

If we were given £250,000 to fight the war again, I wouldn't in fact spend it on a remake of *Wolf Pack*, although that would be tempting. I'd do two things: the first would be to clean up the transcripts. Here for example is a tale told by Wynford Vaughn Thomas, a war correspondent in programme 26, *Remember*, produced by Jeremy Isaacs. The transcript of the interview reads like this:

*Well of course there came a moment when the French Army paused for a moment, and the Americans couldn't quite understand it, they were up in the mountains, and I remember General Pat saying to me , he said Mr Thomas, you know a little bit more about the French. Why aren't they advancing,(blank).... I looked at the map(blank).... At the beginning of the Burgundy vineyard country. I go across and there very rightly there was(blank)..... Looking at the problem, they had (blank).... And they were studying it because it would be tragic if they fought through (blank).... And (blank)....and the great vineyards of Burgundy, never France- would never forgive them and they were paused and suddenly a young (blank) .... arrived and said 'Courage my General. I've found the weak spot of the German defences. Every one is on a vineyard of inferior quality, the (blank)..... and for three days we fought our way through the... and on the third day emerged bewildered looking towards D...and I realised we'd liberated Burgundy.*

About the only sense I can make of this is that "D" must be Dijon. For the rest, it might as well be Linear B. This is what the excerpt looks like on screen

**Clip: Wynford Vaughn Thomas:**

**Narrator:** *Good to remember the good days. The soldiers were welcome. Everyone was happy, the wine was red. Wynford Vaughn Thomas remembers the liberation of the Burgundy vineyards.*

Vaughn Thomas: *Well of course there came a moment when the French Army paused for a moment, and the Americans couldn't quite understand it, they were up in the mountains, and I remember dear General Patch saying to me , he said Mr Thomas, you know a little bit more about the French. Why aren't they advancing? They're at this place Chalon or*

*something. I looked at the map was Chalon-sur-Saône, the beginning of the Burgundy vineyard country. I go across and there very rightly there was de Lattre, Monsalbert and their staff looking at the problem, they had Lamart's 'Atlas Viticole de la France' in front of them and they were studying it because it would be tragic if they fought through Beaune and Nuits St George, and the great vineyards of Burgundy. Never France would never forgive them and they were paused and suddenly a young Sous-lieutenant arrived and said 'Courage my General. I've found the weak spot of the German defences. Every one is on a vineyard of inferior quality.' De Lattre made his decision: 'J'attaque' and for three days we fought our way through the cellars and on the third day I emerged bewildered looking towards Dijon and I realised we'd liberated Burgundy.*

All these transcripts are in the Imperial War Museum. Making sense of them will be slightly less arduous than deciphering Linear B. Anyone who wants to save Wynford Vaughn Thomas and 373 others for posterity is welcome to take on the task.

With the rest of the budget I would construct a website, and the key to this website would be complete transcripts of all the interviews and a shot list. There would be no obligation to use it, but those who went to it would know the visual sources used in the production and would be able to verify their origin, and to decide whether in selecting our interviews we were faithful to the spirit of what our interviewees were trying to say. To do this would be to do no more than follow the normal practice of any print history, and such a thing is long overdue for anyone who wishes for their history to be taken seriously. *The World at War* is serious history.

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